It's been brought to my attention that I made an unfortunate error in the book. In the final chapter I briefly examine a Canadian crowdsourcing firm called Cambrian House, which had intended to use online communities to: A) Generate ideas for new products; B) Determine which of those ideas had merit; and C) Build said products and bring them to market. The crowd turned out to excel at parts A and B, but the company had a difficult time persuading their members to invest the considerable sweat equity involved in launching a new business. And therein lay a lesson about crowdsourcing.
However, I summed up their experience by pondering whether "the failure of Cambrian House signifies the failure of crowdsourcing." (My unequivocal answer, of course, is no it doesn't.) The fact is, Cambrian House didn't fail, even if their original business model did, which is what I meant to imply. The company has shifted to focusing on licensing its software as a sort of crowdsourcing operating system. This shift was underway when I was reporting on the company, but I left that nuance on the cutting room floor. The fact is, I was and remain a big fan of the people behind the company, which embodied some of the best aspects of crowdsourcing, from community respect to total transparency.
I also noted that the company had "sold its assets to the VC-firm Spencer Trask." At the time of writing, such a deal was under discussion. In the end, Spencer Trask only licensed CH's software. Again, my apologies to the good folks at Cambrian House for the error.